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PRAbstract
In response to the failure of Zeelenberg, Plomp, and Raaijmakers (2003) to replicate the results of Se-
amon, Luo, and Gallo (1998) regarding their purported finding of a reliable false memory effect in the
absence of memory for the list items, Gallo and Seamon (2004) report a new experiment that they claim
shows that conscious activation of a related lure during study is not necessary for its subsequent recog-
nition. We critically evaluate their conclusion and argue that the evidence clearly shows that false recog-
nition is critically dependent on the conscious recollection of one or more of the list items. Thus, this as well
as the previous experiments show no evidence for nonconscious processes in producing false memories.
 2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.UN
CO
RR
EC1. IntroductionThe initial study of Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998) attracted our attention because they
claimed to have obtained a reliable false memory effect even when the subjects ‘‘were unable to
discriminate studied words from unrelated nonstudied words’’ (Seamon et al., 1998, p. 20). There
were two main reasons why we were surprised by the conclusions that Seamon et al. drew from
their studies. First, although they claimed to have obtained false memory effects ‘‘even when
memory for list items was essentially absent’’ (p. 25), their data did in fact consistently show
higher hit rates than false alarm rates. Second, they claimed to have presented the items for 20ms
per list item. Based on previous, unrelated, experiments that we had performed using masked
perceptual identification, we thought it highly unlikely that subjects could have identified any of
the list items at such brief presentation times. In view of the fact that performance on the list items
was in fact above chance, we thought it likely that their subjects might have occasionally identified
one or more of the list items (perhaps because their equipment was not suitable for such brief
presentation times). If that was indeed the case, then these identifications might have been re-
sponsible for the observed false memory effects rather than the ‘‘nonconscious processing’’ that
they believed was responsible.1053-8100/$ - see front matter  2003 Published by Elsevier Inc.
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2003.10.002
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
2 Reply / Consciousness and Cognition xxx (2003) xxx–xxx
YCCOG 667
DISK / 17/10/03 / Gomti(CE) / Jayanthi (TE)
No. of pages: 4
DTD 4.3.1/SPS
ARTICLE IN PRESSEC
TE
D
PR
OO
F
In the experiments that we reported in the Zeelenberg, Plomp, and Raaijmakers (2003) paper,
we tried to replicate the Seamon et al. (1998) results using better calibrated equipment for con-
trolling the presentation durations of the stimuli. We reasoned that if nonconscious processing of
the list items could indeed lead to false recognition, we should be able to obtain such an effect
using a more carefully controlled stimulus presentation procedure even when such a procedure
would not lead to conscious activation of list items. Recognition performance for both the pre-
sented list items as well as the nonpresented critical lures was at chance level for stimulus dura-
tions of 20ms and, somewhat to our surprise, even for stimulus durations of 40ms. However, a
veridical recognition memory effect as well as a substantial false memory effect were obtained for
the same items when longer stimulus durations (2000ms) were used.
In order to explain the difference between our results and those of Seamon et al. (1998), we
speculated that ‘‘in the Seamon et al. studies due to the combination of software and hardware
used words were (sometimes) being presented for more than 20ms and that as a result subjects
could occasionally identify the list items.’’ (Zeelenberg et al., 2003, p. 410), a not unreasonable
speculation given the fact that it is very difficult to accurately control presentation times using the
kind of operating system that they used.
Gallo and Seamon (2004) now claim that the use of a 20ms presentation rate was not really
crucial for their conclusions: ‘‘the goal was not to eliminate the perception of the list words, but to
minimize the conscious processing of those list words’’ (p. 6). They even go as far as to assume
that Zeelenberg et al. (2003) did not obtain a false memory effect precisely because the ‘‘pre-
sentation rates were so rapid that even the necessary minimal amount of processing did not oc-
cur’’ (p. 7). However, in the abstract of their 1998 article, they wrote that they ‘‘found that the
subjects falsely recognized semantically related nonstudied words in all conditions, even when
they were unable to discriminate studied words from unrelated nonstudied words.’’ (Seamon et al.,
1998, p. 20; see also the title of their article). Although their present position comes close to our
conclusion that a false memory effect cannot be obtained under conditions where ‘‘the list items
are presented for such a short time that they cannot be identified’’ (Zeelenberg et al., 2003, p. 412),
it is still remarkable that we also did not find any effect at a presentation rate of 40ms, i.e., twice
as long as the 20ms presentation rate that Seamon et al. (1998) claimed to have used in their
experiment. We agree with Gallo and Seamon, (2004, p. 4) that there must have been ‘‘imper-
fections’’ in the techniques that they used for stimulus presentation.RUN
CO
R2. False memories at fast presentation rates: Evidence for nonconscious processes?
Although Gallo and Seamon (2004) now seem to believe otherwise, it is worth emphasizing that
in our view the logic of the evidence for the nonconscious processing conclusion is critically de-
pendent on the assumption that the list items are not consciously identified during study. The
finding of a false memory effect when fast presentation rates are used for list items during study in
and of itself does not mean that the false memory effect is due to nonconsious processes. If one or
more of the items are in fact identified, the obtained false memory effect can be explained in a variety
of ways that do not involve the assumption of nonconscious storage of the critical lure during study.
For example, subjects might think about related words (and hence the critical lure) immediately
after the list has been presented (even when only a few of the list items have been identified).
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Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the obtained false memory effect might be simply due to
the fact that at the time of test the familiarity for the related critical lure would be higher than for
an unrelated item. Such an effect would be predicted by many models for recognition memory,
including global familiarity models such as SAM, TODAM, REM, and MINERVA2 (see, for
example, Criss & Shiffrin, in press). According to these models, a recognition judgment is based
on the match between the test item and all (list) items in memory. Because the match depends on
the similarity between the test item and the items in memory, subjects are more likely to make an
old recognition judgment if semantically or orthographically similar items were presented on the
study list. Thus, global familiarity models predict false memories without assuming that the
critical lure was (consciously or nonconsciously) stored in memory.
Gallo and Seamon (2004) argue that the relative sizes of the false and veridical memory effects
provide additional support for the role of nonconscious processes. They argued that: ‘‘Even if
subjects had consciously processed a few list items, and had used this knowledge to generate a
related lure at study, it is unclear why false memory for this internally generated word would be
greater than accurate memory for those list words that were actually perceived’’ (p. 5). However,
it is not at all clear that the results of Seamon et al. (1998) did in fact show this pattern of results.
If only a few list items are consciously perceived, it may very well be the case that the average
recognition performance for all list items (identified and nonidentified) is not very high although
the recognition performance for those few items that were actually identified is in fact very high or
at least higher than the false recognition performance. Unfortunately, the Seamon et al. data do
not allow such an analysis since we have no information which list items were actually perceived
during the initial list presentation. Consequently, it is unknown what proportion of the identified
list items were recognized on the later memory test. Note that this interpretation assumes that the
probability of (false) recognition for the critical lure will be higher than for the nonidentified list
items. Such an assumption follows quite naturally from global recognition models since the
critical lure will be more strongly related to the identified list items (since it was selected on the
basis of the associations to the list items). CUN
CO
RR
E3. New experiment of Gallo and Seamon (2004)
In their article Gallo and Seamon (2004) report a new experiment (although apparently still
using the same equipment) in which DRM lists were briefly presented during study. Immediately
after each list, subjects were asked to report any word they had seen. In this immediate recall test
subjects rarely generated the related critical lure. At a later two-alternative forced-choice recog-
nition test, however, subjects choose the related lure with a probability of 58% (where the other
alternative is an unrelated control lure corresponding to a different, nonpresented category). Gallo
and Seamon claim that this is strong evidence for their assumption that the related lure was not
generated during the initial list presentation. However, this is again open to alternative inter-
pretations since it may very well be the case that subjects did think of the lure but were able to
decide at the immediate test that this was not one of the list items. After all, in regular free recall
experiments subjects will also think of many other words, yet one rarely sees large numbers of
intrusions on an immediate recall test. Thus, subjects may have thought of the critical lure even
though it was not reported at the immediate recall test. At the later recognition test, however,
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memory may have become more fuzzy, especially in a test situation in which the subjects have to
choose between two items both of which were not presented on the study list.
Maybe more important, the results of the new experiment clearly show that the false memory
effect depends on the number of list items recalled on the immediate test. The more items were
recalled at the immediate test the larger was the false memory effect at the later recognition test.
No false memory effect was obtained for those lists for which no list items were recalled at the
immediate test. These results are consistent with our speculation that in the original experiments
of Seamon et al. (1998) subjects did consciously perceive some of the list items and that this was
responsible for the obtained false memory effects. OD
PR
O4. Conclusions
Given the fact that there are many other explanations for the occurrence of false memory effects
when some of the list items are in fact consciously perceived that do not rely on the assumption of
nonconscious processes, we see no reason to change our conclusion that these experiments fail to
provide evidence for such an assumption. Thus, even though Gallo and Seamon now admit that
‘‘the evidence is mixed as to whether conscious recollection of the list items is necessary’’ (p. 15)
for false recognition, we believe that even that conclusion is not justified given the strong evidence
from their own data that clearly show no false recognition unless at least one list item is (con-
sciously) recalled.NC
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